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 The relationship of Africa, Asia and Latin America to Europe and North America in 
the post-war period is often couched in the language of development.  Something 
seems to be amiss however.  Granted the vast sums invested in trying to find a solution 
to what is described as the problem of underdevelopment, by the criteria of the 
development planners matters should be getting better rather than worse.  Instead it 
would seem that development projects often contribute to the deterioration.  A largely 
neglected aspect of such development is the part played by western scientific 
knowledge.  Not only are indigenous knowledges ignored or dismissed, but the nature 
of the problem of underdevelopment and its solution are defined by reference to this 
world-ordering knowledge.  Anthropologists have long been among those who have 
questioned whether such scientific knowledge is as all-encompassing and efficacious as 
its proponents claim.  So it is apposite that the contributors to this collection, who are 
critical of the workings of scientific knowledge in processes of development, should be 
anthropologists.  The aim is not to offer a solution to the problem of development, 
which has been notoriously elusive.  Development is effectively a synonym for more or 
less planned social and economic change.  So, defining development as a problem 
susceptible of a solution, or pathologically as a condition requiring a cure, may well be 
misplaced.  In the essays which follow the contributors question the presuppositions 
which inform much discussion of development and explore the relationship between 
scientific knowledge and local knowledges in practice.  As systematic knowledge 
grows, so does the possibility of ignorance.1 Ignorance however is not a simple 
antithesis of knowledge.  It is a state which people attribute to others and is laden with 
moral judgement.  So being underdeveloped often implies, if not actual iniquity, at least 
stupidity, failure and sloth. 
 
Some introductory observations 
 
 Because the prevailing rhetoric is of altruistic concern for the less fortunate, it is 
wise to remember that development is big business.  Development aid, including loans, 
probably dwarfs in scale many multi-national industries or the Mafia.  In one form or 
another, development is very profitable not just to the western industries involved, but 
to those parts of governments which receive aid, let alone to development agencies.  
And the giving of development aid and the extension of markets for manufactured 
products is more than balanced by the processes of counter-development, by which the 
countries to be developed make up the major source of cheap raw materials and labour.  
Less obviously, the idea of ‘underdevelopment’ itself and the means to alleviate the 
perceived problem are formulated in the dominant powers’ account of how the world 
is.  The relationship of developers and those to-be-developed is constituted by the 
developers’ knowledge and categories, be it the nation state, the market or the 
                                                 
1 I am particularly grateful to Richard Fardon for first pointing out to me that, as knowledge is usually 
constituted, the growth of knowledge entails the growth of ignorance, and for reading the draft of this 
Introduction.  I would also like to thank Lisa Croll, Philip Quarles van Ufford and Piers Vitebsky for 
their valuable comments; Ron Inden for a useful discussion of some of the general themes; Raymond 
Apthorpe for his continued interest and enthusiasm; and Nanneke Redclift who read the manuscript and 
whose positive comments were a great encouragement.  My special thanks are due to the late Anthony 
Forge and Cecilia Forge for their hospitality and kindness in explaining some of the arcane mysteries of 
development projects at work. 
institutions which are designed to give a semblance of control over these confections.  
The epistemological and power aspects of such processes are often obscured by 
discourses on development being couched predominantly in the idiom of economics, 
technology and management.  What is signally absent in most public discussion of 
development are the ways in which the knowledges of the peoples being developed are 
ignored or treated as mere obstacles to rational progress.2 In order for them to be able to 
progress, these peoples have first to be constituted as ‘underdeveloped’ and ignorant.  
Conversely, without such underdevelopment and ignorance, the west would not be 
developed and possess knowledge. 
 Such ascriptions are not however self-evident, but are part of a long history of 
changing western representations of other societies.  A striking feature of these 
representations is that they are often agentive.  By this I mean that they depict a state of 
affairs requiring action or intervention of some kind, usually by the party doing the 
depicting.  At various times the peoples of much of the world have been portrayed as 
savage, decadent or merely pagan and unenlightened.  So they require law and order, 
effective government or Christianity and civilization.  Whatever the rationale, non-
western societies have been widely represented as static, passive and incapable of the 
progress based on rational government and economic activity which the West alone 
could provide.  The difficulties of planned economic and social development are not 
simply the work of self-interested industries and governments.  The social and 
historical vision of the world order, and the rationality which subtends it, has been in no 
small part constituted and justified by academic writings.3 Insofar as such accounts are 
adopted by the governments or people of developing countries as constitutive of their 
aspirations, they are hegemonic in Gramsci’s sense (e.g. 1988: 189-221). 
 There are more prosaic difficulties with processes of development.  First, by most 
standards of judgement including the professed goals of the developers, most 
development projects fall seriously short.  For instance, in the much-vaunted project to 
irrigate the drought-prone Sahel region in Africa, for each 5,000 hectares of land 
brought under irrigation, exactly the same amount of previously irrigated land was 
turning into salty desert, because of poor drainage.4 An allied problem is the 
presumption in the priority of technology over social considerations.  In Timor in 
Indonesia, it rains heavily for some three months of the year, and is very dry for the 
remaining nine.  So a large dam building project was carried out to bring water to 
particularly arid areas.  When I was there six beautiful ecologically sensitive dams had 
been finished.  None was being used by the population it was supposed to serve.  The 
dams had been built in the best places to build dams.  Unfortunately no one lives within 
many miles.  There is a twist to the tale.  Coincidentally or otherwise, the dams were 
mostly near roads.  So, if people migrated to where water was, government would be 
                                                 
2 There are of course exceptions, such as Brokensha et al. 1980; Chambers 1983.  Both works however 
tend to hypostatize local practices into ‘indigenous knowledge systems’, an approach with which I take 
issue below. 
3 More detailed accounts of such representations and the rôle of western scholars in formulating them are 
to be found in Alatas 1977; Said 1978; Pagden 1982; Fardon 1990; Inden 1990; Mason 1990.  Most of 
these authors make use in some way of the work of Michel Foucault (especially perhaps 1961, 1966, 
1975, 1976), whose approach more implicitly informs the Introduction and a number of essays in this 
volume. 
4 This example is cited by Timberlake 1988: 61.  He notes that the vice president of the World Bank for 
policy, planning and research, David Hopper, an ex-anthropologist, has castigated ‘the anomaly of 
economic calculus’ responsible for the massive damage done in the name of development (1988: 60). 
able to keep an eye on them, rather than them remaining in the hills where no one could 
easily check what they were up to.  Such instances abound; and several are documented 
in the essays below. 
 However, the problems are not simply the failure to achieve sustainable 
development, or that technological or economic concerns often prevail over social 
considerations.  There is little link at times between the theory of rationally planned 
development and the implementation of development policies.  Such disjunctures are 
commonly explained as due to the need to specify theory in practice.  They may more 
accurately be seen though as the limitations of a paradigm, which combines an idealist 
theory of rationality and a naturalist epistemology.  It has proven ill-suited to explain, 
let alone deal with, processes which are non-natural and involve reflexivity on the part 
of the human beings concerned.  A prime example is the difficulties of coping with 
unintended consequences, the nemesis of so much elegant and theorizing, when it 
encounters practice.5 
 Needless to say these difficulties have little impact on either the formulation of 
development policy, still less on the paradigm itself.  As Quarles van Ufford and Long 
(forthcoming) note, the rhetorical appeal of policy formulation is aimed at western 
governments and other donors as the developers’ main constituencies, not at the 
‘targets’ of development.  For this reason among others, the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of projects has been slow to develop, where criteria of success are 
problematic anyway.6 Further, knowledge, especially technical knowledge, is widely 
treated as a valued commodity to be sold or otherwise transferred.  It would be poor 
marketing to question its worth, or whether it is a commodity at all.  More generally, 
scientific epistemology, which underwrites development theories, is far less empirical 
than is supposed (Quine 1953) and, as we shall see, contrary experience can always be 
accounted for without threatening the paradigm as a whole.  A similar point has been 
made by Winch in a neat parody of Evans-Pritchard’s classic study of Zande witchcraft 
(1937) as a closed system of beliefs impervious to ostensibly contrary evidence, when 
he notes that the same can be said of western science (1970: 89).   
 The position adopted by the contributors to this collection, all of whom are 
anthropologists with extensive field experience of development in some form, is that 
claims to knowledge and the attribution of ignorance are central themes to development 
and remain seriously under-studied.  Rather than offer yet more generalization to 
debates on development, they all focus on how kinds of knowledge, western and local, 
are used in practice.  Broadly they treat knowledge not as some abstract conceptual 
system, but as situated practices.  They also take issue with the idea that such practices 
form ‘systems’ of indigenous knowledge, although this does not imply that there are 
                                                 
5 Some of the problems of unintended consequences are outlined in Fabian’s critique of reason and 
western epistemology (1991: 189-98).  The way such epistemologies serve to distance others, to deny 
them coevalness and make them objects or victims rather than subjects and agents is discussed in Fabian 
1983.  Some of the shortcomings of natural scientific and rationalist epistemologies are discussed in 
Quine 1953; Feyerabend 1975; Goodman 1978; Habermas 1978; Rorty 1980; Hacking 1983; and Taylor 
1985. 
6 A good example was presented to the original conference by Till Forster.  A development agency had 
undertaken to increase cattle production for marketing among the Poro of the North Ivory Coast.  They 
left, regarding the project as highly successful, because they had succeeded in their aim.  Not long after, 
the Poro with whom Forster worked said they felt it was a disaster.  This was both because overgrazing 
occurred and because the greater number of cattle, which were used in bridewealth payments, brought 
havoc to marriage arrangements. 
not written canons such as Indian Ayurvedic medicine.  I shall consider in detail below 
how the contributors represent local knowledges.  For the moment it should suffice to 
note that they often appear to be more about ‘knowing how’ than ‘knowing that’ (Ryle 
1949: 26-60), or ‘knowing as’ (Cohen p. 3 in this volume).  They may perhaps usefully 
be considered as a ‘performance’ (Richards), as ‘practical, factual, detailed and 
personal’ (van Beek p. 15) and sensible to the particularities of place, occasion and 
circumstance.  Contrary to popular representations, such knowledges are subject to 
testing and modification, involve theory (van der Ploeg p. 2) and metaphysical 
presuppositions, although not necessarily in the senses imagined in western analytical 
philosophy (Collingwood 1940; Hobart 1985a).  Still less can they be dismissed, as 
often happens, as ‘traditional’ obstacles to rational progress and convenient ‘scape-
goats’ to explain the failure of development programmes (von Benda-Beckmann).   
 While each of the contributors sets out to show the underestimated value of local 
knowledges, none of them however indulge in the (singularly western) romantic 
fantasy of the desirability, even were it possible, of a return to native wisdom 
mysteriously in touch with nature.  Rather the stress is on the value of treating local 
knowledges seriously and examining their potential contribution to peoples’ material, 
intellectual and general welfare.  One feature which many of the contributors elaborate 
is the link of knowledge and agency.  Local knowledges often constitute people as 
potential agents.  For instance in healing, the patient is widely expected to participate 
actively in the diagnosis and cure.  By contrast, scientific knowledge as observed in 
development practice generally represents the superior knowing expert as agent and the 
people being developed as ignorant passive recipients or objects of this knowledge. 
 
Some presuppositions of sociological theories of development 
 
 Sociologists and anthropologists have long been critical of attempts to articulate 
development in purely economic or technological terms, and the assumptions which 
underlie them.  In this section I shall argue however that, despite some well-rehearsed 
differences, sociological theories of development often involve presuppositions drawn 
from the same rational scientific epistemology.  While these theories may be critical of 
certain assumptions of economists, the effect is to replicate the dominant epistemology 
in a subtler guise.7 To the extent that, as I argued above, hegemonic representations 
constitute the conditions of power, then these critics may unwittingly be caught up in 
helping to perpetuate what they claim to criticize.  My aim here then is not a 
comprehensive review of theories of development, but a brief examination of some of 
their presuppositions and the way in which agency is represented. 8 
                                                 
7 This is Just how confused and incoherent the former are is made clear by Hahn & Hollis 1979; and 
Dilley (in press) offers an excellent critique of economic discourse on ‘the market’.  Heath offers a 
straightforward account to the inadequacies of rational choice and exchange theory in economics, which 
he contrasts with more sensitive sociological accounts.  The latter at least allow a measure of context and 
the recognition of relative, as opposed to absolute, value (1976: 44-50).  Both accounts however 
presuppose a model of rationality on which there has been lengthy debate. I know of no good account of 
the presuppositions of sociological and anthropological theory, although Giddens 1976 is basic and quite 
useful.not the place to engage in the substantial undertaking of a critical analysis of the 
philosophical presuppositions of economic or sociological theory.   
8 There are already some good clear reviews of the subject, such as Long 1977, of whom I make use in 
what follows. 
 Development has often been linked to, or equated with, modernization; that is the 
transformation of traditional societies into modern ones, characterized by advanced 
technology, material prosperity and political stability (e.g. Moore 1963).9 As elaborated 
by Smelser (1963), significantly economic development requires inter alia the 
modernization of technology through the application of scientific knowledge and a shift 
from subsistence farming to cash-cropping and wage labour.  Modernization theory 
assumes a unidirectional evolutionary account of social change and is not based on 
actual case materials, but is ‘an idealization of the main direction of certain social and 
cultural trends’ (Long 1977: 26, citing Smith 1973: 87).  It is not just that the categories 
of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are vague and idealized constructions, but the process of 
development is defined teleologically by reference to the supposed state of the 
dominant party.  The means to this transformation is scientific knowledge.  
Significantly such knowledge requires the homogenization and quantifiability of what 
is potentially qualitatively different.10 For instance, kinds of food become cash crops 
and human activities become labour.  What is lumped together here is often regarded 
by the peoples concerned as heterogeneous and qualitatively diverse in practice.  While 
the utility of treating human activities as labour for certain purposes is evident, such 
homogenization underwrites a linear evolutionary view of history (of which Marxist 
histories are as guilty as modernization theory) by ignoring the discontinuities and 
differences in discursive constructions of land, labour, the units or agents of economic 
decision making and the idea of economy itself (Tribe 1978).  Whatever its merits, 
scientific knowledge applied to development is not neutral, as is so often claimed, nor 
are the implications of its use. 
 In modernization theory and others, society or culture is treated, suitably reified, as 
an ‘obstacle’ to change; more rarely as facilitating it.  What is striking for an 
epistemology which claims to represent the world accurately and neutrally is the 
frequency with which abstract and contested notions not only make use of metaphor, 
but the extent to which metaphor is constitutive (see Ortony 1979).  Not only is it 
inherent in the formulation, as here, of development theories; but knowledge itself is 
generally constituted around a metaphor, be it knowledge as a mirror, as a commodity, 
as a space for exploration or expansion (Salmond 1982).  If one removes all explicit 
and implicit references to such metaphorical images, the degree to which many theories 
require modification or rethinking is remarkable.  Society and culture are not obstacles 
to change, nor except loosely can they be said to facilitate change.  Such accounts 
presuppose society or social relations as some hypostatized pseudo-entity.  Arguably 
change is going on all the time and the problem, if any, is to account for the appearance 
of stasis.  In whatever sense society may usefully be said to exist (on which see 
Bhaskar 1979, 1989), it is not an object or entity.  As Hacking has argued at length 
(1990), the construction of such pseudo-entities came into vogue with the 
preoccupation with statistical theorizing in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, 
which was inextricably linked to the extension of control and surveillance of 
populations.   
                                                 
9 Granted the scale of destruction wrought in two World Wars alone this century by the purveyors of this 
‘political stability’, such a vision is a remarkable feat of wishful thinking. 
10 The trend towards standardization around the notion of ‘the average’ does violence to observable 
variation, as in the idea of the fertilizer or pesticide for the average field.  On the tyranny of ‘averages’ 
and ‘norms’, see Hacking 1990; and their relevance to development in economic representations of 
landscape as a homogeneous expanse, see Vitebsky 1992: 242-44. 
 The metaphors implicit in ‘development’ provide an apposite example.  There is a 
certain entelechy in the notion of something unfolding or growing naturally to the 
fulfilment of a potentiality, the seeds or programme for which is already established.  
The refractions of such metaphors may vary between societies and languages.  In 
Indonesia, for example, there are three potential words available.  Perkembangan, from 
the root for ‘flower’, suggests growth which requires little external intervention.  
Kemajuan, ‘progress’, tends to be linked to western liberal economic and political 
ideas, with connotations of rationality.  The third, pembangunan, from the root for ‘get 
up, grow up, build’ is the term favoured by government officials and developers 
because, as Quarles van Ufford points out,  
this process does not realize itself automatically, but needs outside action or 
encouragement.  So, the process of development cannot realize itself if careful 
guiding and cultivation do not take place’ (1985: 57) 
For the term ‘development’, metaphor does not merely illuminate, but is constitutive.  
The end state and the nature of the process is, partly at least, predefined or prescribed.  
It does not of course follow that the action prescribed by some account is fully 
determined.  The adoption of pembangunan as the chosen idiom neatly combines 
entelechy with the need for guidance by those with power and knowledge, here the 
government officials who elaborated the notion in the first place. 
 To return to development theories, a problem of modernization theory is that it 
omits recognition of wider social and historical processes.  This criticism is central to 
‘dependency theory’, according to which structures of dependence are set up by the 
world capitalist system, which penetrates local societies and economies, and extends 
down to tie apparently remote workers to the system (e.g. Frank 1969).  The use to 
metaphor to add impact is significant.  First, there is a pervasive spatial metaphor of 
‘up/down’, ‘metropolitan centre/satellite’, in which capitalism is portrayed as superior 
and central, or what below I describe as a ‘transcendental agent’.11 This is capped by a 
sexual metaphor (capitalism ‘penetrating’), in which the powerful, superior, male West 
imposes itself on weak, inferior, captivated (and female) others.  Indeed there is a 
further carceral image (the ‘tied’ worker) of development as punitive, as against 
modernization theory’s vision of development as reform (cf. Foucault 1975).  It is 
hardly surprising therefore that dependency theory tends to underestimate locally 
motivated change and other kinds of relationships.  Once again, social and economic 
institutions like ‘capitalism’ and ‘class’ are at once reified and abstracted from actual 
social and historical situations (Laclau 1971). 
 The corrective to such broad institutional analyses stresses the importance of 
individual entrepreneurs in economic and social change.  Such accounts are almost 
always transactionalist, the anthropological resuscitation of utilitarianism, in which 
rational individuals set out self-interestedly to maximize their utility, whether defined 
as wealth, power or status (e.g. Bailey 1957, 1969; Barth 1963, 1966; cf. Paine 1974).  
The rejoinder is hardly unexpected.  Collectivism and individualism in one form or 
another are entrenched intellectual positions in a long running battle.12 The dispute is 
                                                 
11 On the widespread use in English of orientational metaphors like height to suggest superiority, 
goodness, power etc., see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14-21. 
12 A famous rehearsal is the debate between Durkheim and Tarde (see Lukes 1973a: 302-13).  The 
methodological argument of whether to explain action by reference to collectivities or individuals (see 
Lukes 1973b) is still alive in Hayek’s (individualist) theory of monetarism.  Giddens’s attempt to 
somewhat phoney, because the alternatives presuppose and depend on one another 
more than is often recognized (Bhaskar 1979: 39-47). 
 Obviously much more could be, and has been, said about development theories.  
Because of their relevance to the theme of this volume, I am particularly concerned 
however with questions of explanation, especially the description (or prescription) of 
the nature of knowledge, rationality and agency, and their attribution. I deal with each 
in turn briefly. 
 It would be very convenient if, among rival theories, we could decide which was 
more or less correct, and also judge the rival merits of accounts based on western as 
against indigenous knowledge.  While theories may sometimes be disqualified by 
failing to fit facts, often they are not fully verifiable or they account more or less 
adequately for the available evidence, so that there is no simple empirical method of 
judging between them.  This underdetermination of theory by evidence, as Quine has 
made clear is because  
the totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs...is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only at the edges...  the total field is so underdetermined by 
its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what 
statements to revaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.’ (1953: 42-43) 
Additional criteria are required to decide which theory to adopt (Hesse 1978).  For 
developers, this is likely to be models which are generalizable or appear to offer the 
greatest predictability or the semblance of control over events.  Developers are often 
asked to complete research and even projects within absurdly short time-spans.  So they 
tend to have to work with pre-established guidelines and assume particular conditions 
fit a general mould.  Charming absurdities can result.  In the Timorese project 
mentioned, it is an established rule apparently that piping water costs 1% of the 
expenditure on dam construction.  That this left taps in the middle of nowhere was 
neither here nor there.  (Were local people to indulge in such thinking, they would be 
deemed irrational.)  Anthropologists, on the other hand, have an obvious interest in 
explanatory accounts which are as compatible as possible with observable events and 
with the representations of events by the participants.13 Incommensurability between 
accounts of what is going on in development are not just theoretically possible, but are 
usually the case in practice.  For anthropologists, this is part of their subject matter. 
 The historical and sociological aspects of scientific knowledge has increasingly 
been recognized (e.g. Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1975).  The extent to which such 
knowledge is a social activity was neatly put by Peirce in 1868. 
the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially 
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an 
indefinite increase in knowledge’ (1984 (1868): 239; capitals in the original). 
The criteria of what constitutes knowledge, what is to be excluded and who is 
designated as qualified to know involves acts of power (Foucault 1971).  Once more 
prescriptions of the nature of knowledge and how the knower is constituted are 
strikingly metaphoric.  As Rorty has pointed out, a presupposition in much western 
                                                                                                                                              
combine the two (e.g. 1984) arguably leaves him with two sets of questionable presuppositions, which 
are additionally partly incompatible, rather than just one. 
13 My observations are preliminary, because the whole question of choice between rival theories is 
complicated and remains under-investigated.  One might note however that issues of value are often used 
in choosing preferred explanations.  So a particular political, moral or religious orientation is not 
necessarily an unwarranted imposition on neutral matters of fact, but one kind of criterion of choice.  
Anyway the supposed neutrality of scientific knowledge is misleading. 
epistemology is that the human mind is like a mirror which reflects reality and 
problems of accurate knowledge boil down to repairing the mirror (1980).  The 
monopoly on this knowledge is held, in a rather inspecific way, by the west (another 
significantly imprecise term).  Development consists in no small part of knowledge, 
positivitically conceived as true propositions about the world, being treated as a 
valuable resource.  Both this latter commodity metaphor of knowledge and the mirror 
metaphor notably exclude the idea of knowing being a dialectical and critical process.  
Criticism in development tends to be a synonym for telling off the ignorant or lazy 
natives, not the crucial means to understanding or, more realistically, reducing the 
degree of misunderstanding.14  
 A related and important metaphorical representation, as Peirce noted, is of 
knowledge as growing.15 Apart from treating knowledge as a quasi-natural entity, the 
implicit entelechy gives a sense of inevitability and so superiority to those who master 
or are part of this process of growth.  Remarkably, it seems to have largely slipped 
notice that the postulated growth of knowledge concomitantly entails the possibility of 
increasing ignorance.  In development this is manifested practically in local 
knowledges being devalued or ignored, in favour of western scientific, technical and 
managerial knowledge.16 As we shall see when discussing agency, such constructions 
have implications for power in the ways in which people are differently constructed as 
subjects or objects, agents or patients, according to different kinds of knowledge.  
Perhaps I should note at this point that these criticisms of representations of scientific 
knowledge do not imply that it is not, and has not been, of great value and import.  It is, 
following Collingwood (1933: 26-53), to note that scientific and philosophical 
knowledge (to which I would add historical and anthropological knowledge as well) are 
dialectically related, such that the latter serve critically to reflect on the implications 
and consequences of the former. 
 The idea of development as governed by rational progress has some similar 
implications to the image of knowledge growing.  The whole issue of the nature and 
relevance of rationality to human action has been the subject of long debate involving 
philosophers and anthropologists (see Wilson 1970; Hollis and Lukes 1982; Overing 
1985).  For present purposes, a few observations will suffice.  The relationship between 
theoretical and practical reason is unclear in practice.  Advocates of some universal 
rationality disagree among themselves not only of what this rationality consists, but 
whether it is an a priori necessity of cognition and communication (Hollis 1970, 1982) 
or is establishable a posteriori from its evident success (e.g. Newton-Smith 1982).  
                                                 
14 Misunderstanding is not simply explained by poor communication, but is an actively fostered process - 
often by both sides (Benda-Beckmann).  Many of the criticisms of those who are the objects of 
development are projections, such as the tendency to think in the short term and the search for magical 
solutions. 
15 Consider the title of the celebrated collection of essays criticizing Kuhn’s work, Criticism and the 
growth of knowledge. 
16 There is a long history of western philosophical bias in favour of episteme, theoretical knowledge, 
against techne, applied science, art, skill, which is geared to production (poietike) with the corresponding 
need for judgement (doxa) and even against the practical sciences (praktike) of politics and ethics.  For 
Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and necessary...  This being so, the first 
principle from which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, of art, 
or of practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can be demonstrated and art and practical 
wisdom deal with things that are variable...  some even of the lower animals have practical wisdom’ 
(Aristotle 1941: 1027-28).) 
Even allowing for changing usage of terms, one could hardly be clearer. 
Even where rationality is defined narrowly by logic, there is disagreement over whether 
it is descriptive, prescriptive or a formal condition of thought about the world.  Whether 
everyone shares this vision of the world as ultimately knowable through the exercise of 
reason, let alone whether they take decisions on this basis, is doubtful.  Balinese for 
instance make use of a quite distinct form of reasoning (Hobart 1985a), but recognize 
both the importance of human feeling and attitudes, and the possibility that some 
matters may be unknowable to human beings, whose mental capacities are not 
limitless.17 Assertions of rationality should perhaps be regarded as ex post facto claims 
in particular situations and as part of social action. 
 The previous discussion is relevant to a problem which is increasingly being 
recognized as important in development projects and is often implicated in their failure.  
This is the nature of the understanding between the parties involved.  The desired goal 
is usually expressed in terms of communication. ‘In order to have development and to 
have people understand how development is to be applied to their particular case, 
developers need to communicate with "developees"‘ (Brokensha et al. 1980: 7).  The 
implication is that, if both sides improve communication a major obstacle (sic) will be 
removed.  Such a view is naïvely optimistic.  Not only does it ignore the many reasons 
people may have for not wishing to communicate and indeed to want to dissimulate 
(e.g. Quarles van Ufford in this volume).  It also rests upon a model of knowledge as 
communicable propositions and presumes rationality to be shared.  The mirage of 
perfect communication presupposes communication to be the relatively simple business 
of transmitting knowledge as information between sender and receiver.  (One might 
note that there is no obvious antonym of ‘information’, the antithetical terms being 
significantly ‘misinformation’, or even ‘disinformation’.)  Problems are conceived of 
mechanically and are held to arise where the code is not shared, there are difficulties in 
the medium and so on.  Wallace has pointed out, however, all that is required is that the 
parties concerned can find equivalences of some kind.  Not only do they not need to 
understand each other, but it is questionable how well social relations would work if 
people regularly did so (1961: 29-44).  Such a model of communication assumes a 
‘conduit metaphor’, in which language ‘contains’ meaning inserted by the speaker and 
extracted by the listener.  Reddy has argued in favour of an alternative image of 
communication being a matter of degree and the end result of much mutual work 
(1979).  This is close to what how I use the notion of understanding, which is inevitably 
always imperfect, dialectical and critical.18  
 Anthropologists’ experience of what goes on in development projects seems better 
to fit an account of communication as requiring work.  The social worlds of developers, 
whether foreigners or nationals, are almost always far apart from those being 
developed, as is the nature of their involvement, what is at stake and the perceived 
                                                 
17 Quarles van Ufford (1985: 53-56) has a good discussion of the importance of feeling, rasa, and its link 
to mystery, rahsya, in neighbouring Java. 
18 The position which I take is closer to Volosinov’s (1973) or Bakhtin’s (1986) vision of speech as 
situated acts.  Significantly the word ‘knowledge’ in English has connotations of ‘the passive content of 
what is known’ by contrast to the German Erkenntnis and French connaissance, which emphasize ‘the 
act, process, form, or faculty of knowing’ (Shapiro 1972: 319).  I discuss the contrast between knowing 
and understanding in some detail in Hobart forthcoming. 
 The trend in development projects towards more direct ‘participation’ or ‘involvement’ rests upon 
the presupposition that this will somehow improve communication, which is questionable.  At least 
‘participation’ - if it involves knowing the relevant languages, and the social and cultural context - does 
not preclude the possibility of less misunderstanding. 
purpose of the enterprise (Arce and Long).  Even where developers have sufficient 
command of language to speak and listen, the relationship of developers and developed 
are usually regarded as hierarchical by both parties.  So communication easily becomes 
the giving of information or instructions by those with expert knowledge.  And all too 
often the only effective means of disagreement is silence or the refusal to engage in 
enterprises as defined by the superior party, who may treat those to be developed as 
invisible anyway (van der Ploeg p. 12).  For these reasons, it is convenient to talk of 
there being several coexistent discourses of development.  By ‘discourse’ here, I am 
adapting Foucault’s term for the regularities of what is said and done, including 
importantly the conditions of knowledge and power with its inevitable closures (see 
esp. 1972: 21-76).  Although discourse is a difficult notion, which seems to work best 
on grand-scale historical reconstructions, it does draw attention to the differential 
working of knowledges and powers in practice.  This includes notably prevailing 
metaphors of knowledge and communication, and of the nature of power.  In this sense 
then it may be useful to distinguish for the moment at least three discourses, which may 
partly overlap.  Apart from the professional discourse of developers and the discourse 
of the local people being developed, the national government and its local officials 
commonly also have distinctive powers and forms of enshrined knowledge, with their 
concomitant closure19. Just how separate and indeed incommensurable are the 
respective discourses of developers, developed and governments is a striking feature of 
many of the essays in this volume. 
 We have seen how constructions of knowledge may be agentive, in that they 
indicate who is qualified to know and act, and who not.  They may also indicate the 
course or nature of the action to be taken.  It is instructive briefly to review some of the 
theories of social development outlined above in this light.  Most theories emphasize 
the need for planned change.  In other words, existing organizations cannot achieve the 
desired goals on their own.  So how are these organizations conceived and what form 
of necessary agency is postulated?  In modernization theory the stress is on the 
deficiencies of traditional institutions which people, treated as passive objects, are 
incapable of changing.  Dependency theory likewise construes people as the passive 
victims of forces over which they have no control, here the capitalist market economy.  
According to the former the problem is the absence of agents; according to the latter a 
nigh omnipotent and alien agent.  The agency for change in either case must therefore 
come from planners, who have a superior understanding of the structures responsible 
and capacity to change or replace them.   
 At first sight both theories might seem to aim to make previously passive objects 
agents.  This is however not so.  Closer inspection shows that the diffusion of modern 
technology is supposed to provide an example (a ‘demonstration effect’) to 
‘progressive’ farmers.  Or, more radically, progressive elements will rise to meet the 
demands and opportunities of new structures.  In other words, the populace is 
constituted as willing subjects, the planners provide the intelligence about the workings 
of the modern economy or the will of the revolution, but determine neither.  The 
ultimate agents are therefore transcendental, various groups of humans making up the 
instruments through which they work.  The point is perhaps clearer if we consider the 
transactionalist approach or its avatar, the New Right’s emphasis on the market as the 
                                                 
19  It may be helpful to consider other major institutionalized discourses, for instance in Latin America 
that of the catholic church. 
sufficient condition of change.  Once again agency at first seems vested in the 
enterprising individual.  But he or she only responds to market forces, the patterns of 
which are elucidated by economists, planners and others.  It is the market itself which 
determines what happens.  Ultimately, you cannot buck the market: it is the market 
which decides.  In different ways then agency is attributed to supra-human forces, 
which certain groups of humans are particularly well placed to know about.20 
 It should be clear that we are dealing with representations of how matters are 
claimed to be.  In practice what happens is far more complex, variable and 
underdetermined than can be encapsulated in any single account.  Such representations 
however play an important part in social action.   Anthropologists’ subject matter 
consists in large part of conflicting representations of actions and events, which directly 
affect future actions.  How knowledge, power and agency is represented and 
responsibility attributed in different situations are therefore issues of interest; and their 
relevance to development forms the theme of this volume. 
 
Knowledge in practice 
 
 An uncomfortable conclusion of the foregoing argument that theories are 
underdetermined and consist of representations of events with consequences for power 
and knowledge is that our own writings are implicated in this process.  The work of 
academics affects what happens in various ways (Fabian 1991).  Indeed there is the risk 
of these writings becoming part of the processes of hegemony, which they ostensibly 
set out to criticize.  While there may be no neutral privileged position from which to 
capture a timeless truth, it does not follow that all representations are equal, or that 
nothing worthwhile can be said at all.  A potentially useful task for anthropologists, as 
‘priests of humanistic plurality’ (Richards p. 1), is to discuss critically how the 
relationship between expert knowledge and local knowledges work out in practice, as 
we understand it.  This task is less easy than might seem.  To construe local knowledge 
as systematic, or even to classify practices of dealing with the world as ‘knowledge’, is 
to domesticate practice by recourse yet again to a hegemonic epistemology.  In this 
Introduction therefore, I neither can, nor wish to, delineate a general account of 
indigenous knowledges.  To do so would be to replicate what I have criticized as the 
shortcomings of theories which claim such spurious generality and authority.  What I 
can perhaps usefully do however is to examine how knowledge and agency is 
attributed, and how local knowledge is represented in the accounts of the contributors 
for the societies on which they work. 
 In practice, government officials representing the nation state play a central rle in 
attributing knowledge, ignorance and agency in the specification of development 
policy.  Croll discusses how this worked in the post-revolutionary period between 1949 
and 1976 in China.  The example is the more interesting because, in a attempt to 
reverse the vision of knowledge as stemming from the educated lite, ostensibly it was 
portrayed as coming from ‘the masses’ - a term which significantly depersonalizes and 
diffuses agency.  The new officials spoke of government learning from the limitless 
wisdom of the masses (Croll p. 1).  ‘In practice, what this formula demanded was that 
the scattered and unsystematic views of the masses be collected by the state, carefully 
                                                 
20 In this account I have made use of an unpublished paper by Inden (n.d.) on how agency is constituted 
in social scientific theories.  I elaborate the argument about agency in more detail in Hobart 1990. 
studied, co-ordinated, and translated into policy’ (p. 2).  As problems inevitably 
emerged in putting this reworked and decontextualized knowledge into practice, local 
populations came progressively to be defined as backward and ignorant by higher level 
administrative cadres.  So they became represented not as agents, but as objects to be 
changed.  Croll makes clear that such definitions of agency are a continual and 
contested process (p. 16) and must be understood in the social and political situations of 
their attribution. 
 An important instrument in codifying knowledge and fixing agency in practice is 
through law.  As Benda-Beckmann points out however, although there is ample 
evidence that it is not so, ‘the assumption that local law hinders development and that 
modern, western law is a prerequisite for development is one of the most deeply rooted 
ideas which informs development planning’ (p. 2).  Modern law becomes a ‘magic 
charm’ and local law is represented by developers as the ‘scape-goat’ for the failure of 
development.  Agency is attributed to legal structures, through ‘the idea that legal 
structures and norms directly cause or determine action and its consequences’ (p. 2).  
Local law, among Minangkabau in Sumatra, is construed by officials concerned with 
development as an idealized, traditional system rather than as practices adjusted to 
changing circumstances.  Villagers collaborate in this representation, but for quite 
different reasons.  They make use of their perception of outsiders’ ideas of traditional 
law as a means to articulate and legitimate their opposition to what they judge to be 
ignorant interference. 
 The extent to which different discourses are implicated in development is brought 
out by Arce and Long.  In an extended case study, they examine the fate of a well-
meaning technician from the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, who tried to represent 
the interests of local peasants, only to land up in a special remedial unit for 
‘troublemakers’.  The farmers concerned lived by growing maize to eat and to feed 
cattle which they sold, as they did marijuana, through markets which were not 
government approved.  They wanted a baling machine to increase productivity.  Such a 
scheme however contravened the centrally planned policy, according to which they had 
been designated as a region for increased maize production for marketing through 
official channels.  The farmers’ ‘underdevelopment’ consisted in part in their not 
producing what, and as, was officially recognized.  The difficulties also involved 
incompatibilities of knowledge in practice.  The dictates of scientific agronomy 
militated against the crop rotation preferred by farmers, based on their experience of 
land conditions, in favour of the intensive use of pesticides and other chemicals in order 
to maximize productivity.  The farmers objected that this increased crop disease in the 
long run (p. 10).  The attempt of the agricultural official to aid his clients conflicted 
with the official policy of maize production and was treated as a challenge to his 
superior.  The outcome confirmed the senior officials’ ideas of the recalcitrance and 
stupidity of the peasants and their distrust in government.  The failure of such centrally-
directed planning is explained as the deficiency of the objects of development and of 
those whose task it is to implement policy. 
 The nature and difficulties of development are often portrayed spatially.  The 
rejection of ‘planning from above’ in favour of a ‘bottom up approach’ does not 
however necessarily change matters, because the terms and the kind of action expected 
usually remain defined by ‘superiors’.  For a project from an outer province of 
Indonesia, Quarles van Ufford shows how ‘there is a discrepancy between the official 
language of the development agency - the "bottom up approach", and local 
"homogeneity" - generating images of an active involvement of the peasants in the 
project activities, and the virtual absence of any such involvement at the local level as 
observed by some anthropologists’ (p. 3).  Expert knowledge is manifested here in a 
rhetoric of development and planning, which postulates a ‘system’ and suggests the 
rôles of the various participants are integrated, thereby creating the impression of 
manageability.  The discourse of developers is often resistant to counter-evidence.  
When a team was sent to evaluate the project and reported that the local organizations 
set up neither really represented the peasants nor could function effectively, the report 
had to be buried.  Many projects, Quarles van Ufford argues, appear to work because 
those to be developed are forced to be secretive and compartmentalize their lives (p. 
11).  There is an unbridgeable, but largely unappreciated, gap between the neat 
rationality of development agencies’ representations which imagine the world as 
ordered or manageable and the actualities of situated social practices, an 
incommensurability tidied away in sociological jargon as ‘unintended consequences’.  
The result is that the overlap of developers’ and local discourses does not lead to 
improved communication, but to strain on those locals who are involved in both, and to 
techniques of evasion, silence and dissimulation.21  
 In different ways, discursively, some people are empowered to know and decide, 
others to implement the decisions, yet others not to speak, or not to be heard if they do.  
It is not just officials and developers who ascribe ignorance to locals; the reverse 
occurs.  Ignorance is also Janus-faced.  It may be used actively as a means of ignoring 
what others say and do.  To speak of strategies of ‘resistance’ or ‘denial’ on the part of 
those designated as inferior is to assume that they recognize and submit to the 
hegemonic representation of them.  For this reason I would suggest resurrecting the old 
English word ‘obliviate’, which implies an active ignoring of such representations and 
the prosecution of one’s own point of view.22 Representatives of nation states may use 
means of trying to enforce government policies as a claim or demonstration of power.  
But, while planners tend to work with idealized, timeless and depersonalized versions 
                                                 
21 Over the years, Philip Quarles van Ufford and I have argued amicably over the relationship between 
theorizing and participation in development, which is one of the constructive tensions of EIDOS.  We 
both eschew the powerful fantasy that there is some notionally neutral theoretical eyrie from which to 
gaze dispassionately.  But, as someone who has been directly involved in development projects, Quarles 
van Ufford is sensitive to the gap between detached academic understanding and the predicament of the 
participating ‘expert’, who cannot separate theory and practice and who must assume some sort of 
coherence and system, some rationale for the venture, in order to be able to function.  I lack his kind of 
experience, but am concerned that such a position far from resolving the relationship of theory and 
practice perpetuates it, and its implications, under the name of necessity, involvement or commitment.  
Theorizing which is not thinking about an object is arguably arid; and the idea that practice does not 
involve theory is absurd. 
22 Finding a suitable term required a bibulous evening with Richard Fardon.  One should not confuse 
silence or the absence of activity, as the two examples from Indonesia make especially clear, with a lack 
of agency.  Not only is ostensible passivity potentially an active strategy, but in parts of the world it may 
be considered the hallmark of an agent (Burghart p. 5).  The efficacy of silence has been picturesquely 
discussed by Baudrillard, who also makes the point that those constituted as ‘the masses’ may be part of 
our own societies. 
That the silent majority (or the masses) is an imaginary referent does not mean that they don’t exist.  It means 
that their representation is no longer possible...  No one can be said to represent the silent majority, and that is 
its revenge...  The strategy of power has long seemed founded on the apathy of the masses.  The more passive 
they were, the more secure it was.  But this logic is only characteristic of the bureaucratic and centralist phase 
of power.  And it is this which today turns against it: the inertia it has fostered becomes the sign of its own 
death’ (1983: 20, 22, 23; emphases in the original). 
of an imagined world which is to be regulated, local people are often clearly aware of 
the personal, particular nature of the specification of policy or law in practice.  Agency 
is rarely as clear-cut as its ascriptions suggest. 
 
Knowledge as practice 
 
 The approach to local knowledge taken by those contributors who deal explicitly 
with the theme stresses the importance of treating knowing as a practical, situated 
activity, constituted by a past, but changing, history of practices.  Such knowing 
requires evaluation by some measure like appropriateness to particular circumstances, 
rather than by its being true as such.  The latter is often meaningless, when one is 
talking of a performance or knowledge which is so local that it could not be 
authentically codified (Burghart p. 2).  The contributors make use of various recent 
authors who have, in different but related ways, been critical of the dominant approach 
of systematic epistemological theorizing.  Several contributors cite the work of 
Giddens, whose account of structuration seeks to relate the institutional aspects of 
structure to action and agency (1979, 1984; cf. Held & Thompson 1989).  Another 
relevant scholar is Bourdieu, who has argued for an analysis of action based on 
accepted social practices, or habitus (1977, 1990).  One should note however that what 
the contributors understand by practice differs radically from the term as often used by 
developers, as the implementation of theory.  This dichotomy is misleading, both in the 
postulated hierarchical relation of theory and practice, and in the failure to consider 
theorizing itself as a practice with its own history of usage, closure and consequences.23  
 In this sense, the approach of most of the contributions is broadly ‘post-
structuralist’.  A drawback of much post-structural writing is that it is often 
programmatic, polemical and applied on a grand scale, which is ill-suited to fine 
grained studies.  Also such writings remain largely eurocentric and dominated by 
textual, literary and linguistic concerns, so replicating in subtler form the 
presuppositions they set out to criticize.  The attempt in this collection is to explore 
how some of the critiques and insights of post-structuralism or post-modernism can 
illuminate how knowledges are constituted and work as practices. 
 For these reasons, many of the contributors take issue with accounts which 
represent indigenous knowledge as systematic.  This is a difficulty in different ways 
with two kinds of recent approach by anthropologists.  The first is expounded in the 
essays in Brokensha et al., significantly titled Indigenous knowledge systems and 
development (1980).  While the value of pointing out the importance of non-western 
kinds of knowledge is shared, the assumption that knowledge is systematic is 
diametrically opposed to the aim of the present work.  The second approach is that of 
Clifford Geertz, elaborated in a collection of essays entitled Local knowledge (1983a).  
He argues for taking seriously ‘local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class 
and variety of issue, but as to accent - vernacular characterizations of what happens 
connected to vernacular imaginings of what can’ (1983b: 215).  The strength of his 
argument is in drawing attention to the need to treat what happens contextually in terms 
                                                 
23 Developers who think that they are dealing commonsensically with theory-free practice in the ‘real 
world’ are fooling themselves.  As Collingwood remarked, such ‘"realism" is based upon the grandest 
foundation a philosophy can have, namely human stupidity’ (1940: 34). 
of ideas and beliefs in the culture in question.24 The difficulties include his making use 
of a pervasive (western) dramaturgical metaphor of social action and assuming 
sufficient epistemological similarity as to make ‘cultural translation’ possible (see also 
Richards’s critique of intellectualism below).  Such accounts further exemplify their 
‘modernist’ assumptions in ascribing agency to the interpreter and his or her superior 
understanding.  While acknowledging local knowledges is important, whether it offsets 
the simultaneous, subtle hegemonizing of others is a moot point. 
 Most of the contributors share the view that the peoples they write about ‘seem to 
work more through a body of practices - knowing how to do things and to react to 
changes, a set of practical procedures - than through a formal system of shared 
knowledge’ (van Beek p. 2), which permits new practices to be adopted easily (p. 18).  
Significantly, in many instances, the terms for ‘knowledge’ are active verbs, as for 
Dogon who speak of ‘knowing the word’, which implies knowing both language and its 
use in accounts of their history (p. 17).  Indeed without realizing how such knowing is 
historically constituted, including the long-standing threat of slavery, it is hard to 
understand why cultivation is oriented towards optimizing survival not maximizing 
harvests.  Land is not treated as a homogeneous area but as finely differentiated; and, 
gerundively, as manageable, usable or otherwise in varying degree (p. 13). 
 The contrast between two kinds of agricultural knowledge in Andean potato 
farming is clearly drawn out by van der Ploeg.  Drawing on Mendras’s notion of l’art 
de la localité (1970), he notes that, to say that agricultural knowledge works from 
practice to practice, does not entail that such thinking is without theory, rather its 
syntax ‘is not the nomological one of science; the scope is not a presupposed universe’, 
but localized through labour as ‘savoir-faire’ (p. 2), in a process which ‘presupposes an 
active, knowledgeable actor, who is actually the "agent" of the unity and constant 
interaction of mental and manual work’ (p. 4).  Whereas the model formally used for 
scientific plant-breeding starts with an ideal plant type, a genotype, as ‘the point of 
departure for the specification of the required phenotypic conditions’, Andean farmers 
deliberately mix and try out cultivars, so that the given phenotypic conditions are 
treated as ‘starting points for the selection and adaptation of genotypes’ (p. 9).  The 
contrasting kinds of practice involve sharply different ways of representing time, 
causation, work and knowledge in practice. 
 Richards expresses a parallel concern with representations of time and 
intentionality.  Farming systems researchers tend to regard intercropping as part of a 
predetermined design, which ‘is to confuse intention and result’, because the mix of 
crops is ‘a completed performance’, not a ‘combinatorial logic’ but ‘sequential 
adjustment to unpredictable conditions’.  For this reason the protected environments of 
research stations are ‘"out of time" and "out of place"‘, because ‘cultivation is a 
performance’ in time and in place, not a rehearsal (p. 5).  Attempts to consider situated 
practices as indigenous knowledge systems therefore involves ‘a fallacy of misplaced 
abstraction - the making of intellectual mysteries out of situations and activities whose 
practical import is obvious to all but the observer’ (p. 1).  Instead Richards argues for 
treating agriculture - and by extension many other activities - as performances, which is 
not to invoke a dramaturgical metaphor but a practical image, as in a musical 
                                                 
24 Anthropologists often rightly invoke context in situating or explaining action.  Quite what context is 
however is elusive (Hobart 1985b).  One should also note that essentializing and contextualizing are 
explanatory strategies with implications for power and are not confined to academics or experts (Hobart 
1986: 138-51). 
performance.25 Knowing in this sense is bringing skills learnt through practice and 
historically-derived experience to bear on a particular matter on a particular occasion.  
(We tend to overlook how much writing articles - and Introductions - is a similar craft 
skill which has to be learned.)  Ability to speak is therefore an important form of 
knowing, ‘a licence to perform’ (p. 10).  An implication of this point might be noted by 
developers, namely that learning to use a language well is not simply a matter of 
‘communicating’ information, but being able to perform adequately. 
 People may represent what they know as systematic, for instance to express their 
distinctiveness and to rebuff others’ claims to expert knowledge.  Ascriptions of 
knowledge and ignorance involve peoples’ perceptions of their social relations with one 
another and with outsiders, as Cohen makes clear (p. 7).26 The islanders of Whalsay in 
the Shetlands were successful in acquiring and making profitable an exceptionally 
modern fleet of fishing boats against expert and British government advice.  To the 
locals it is not that outside experts are technically deficient.  It is ‘less a matter of what 
is known than of how it is known’ (p. 4).  ‘Objective’ knowledge must be reworked and 
considered reflexively in the light of peoples’ historical experience and assessment of 
the present circumstances (p. 5).  If the image of indigenous knowledge as systematic is 
fallacious, then the ‘popular proposition that successful innovation requires the 
"translation" of an alien idea into an indigenous idiom is revealed as hopelessly 
simplistic as well as being insidious’ (p. 8).  Cohen argues cogently that local 
knowledge exists as rival versions, which are not separable from the social conditions 
of their being known (p. 11), and which make possible a rich and dialectical argument.  
The fact that outsiders fail to appreciate this confirms their ignorance. 
 Burghart provides a detailed example of such cultural argument, which involved 
different versions of knowledge and concomitant ascriptions of agency, when he tried 
to improve the quality of water in a well in a town in south-eastern Nepal.  I cannot 
reproduce the twists and turns of the argument here.  Briefly Burghart shows how the 
Cobblers, whose well it was, treated him not as a social scientist, but as a Hindu lord 
‘with the commanding function of mind’.27 Although the planned cleaning of the well 
was worked out between Burghart and the Cobblers, when the water turned bitter, he 
was converted from benevolent lord to a malevolent one.  Burghart and the Cobblers 
were working with different versions of knowledge, which had different agentive 
implications.  He ‘went to them with an interest in their health; they were concerned, 
however, with their well-being’ (p. 17); he took their complaint literally, when they 
were signalling the ‘bitter’ quality of their lives to someone they saw as a potential 
benefactor.  There are incommensurabilities between discourses, in which constructions 
                                                 
25 Fabian is similarly discontent with existing styles of anthropological analysis and sets out to treat 
social action, including the process of ethnography, as a complex of performances.  He finds in the work 
of Victor Turner evidence of a move away from performance as dramaturgical to a less metaphoric and 
fraught usage (1990: 16-20). 
26 In similar vein, Parkin (1975) has argued that planned change depends crucially on an awareness of 
social divisions among those concerned.  Where there is substantial agreement, it is easier to mobilize 
people about a specific ‘plan’.  Where there are serious differences, talk of the need for development 
becomes a ‘symbol’ to attempt to minimize the effects of such differences. 
27 In societies like China and India, ascriptions of the ability to know are not necessarily egalitarian and 
are far from fixed (Croll p. 16).  Experts may know about or how to do things which others do not.  Often 
knowing is considered a matter of degree and involves a chain of overlapping agency and patiency, 
whereas when knowledge is professionalized it often leads to those who are not designated as knowing 
being objects of that objectified knowledge. 
of agency and power are inseparable from representations of knowledge.  In this light, 
the much-vaunted development strategy of relying on ‘folk competence’ was bound to 
run into difficulties.  ‘Rather than implying that successful development projects 
entailed a dual agency, research on folk competence held out yet again the hope to 
development workers of their ultimate control of the entire process’ (p. 2). 
 
On ignorance 
 
 In conclusion, what implications might this discussion of local and expert 
knowledges have for representations of ignorance?  In one sense, the seemingly safe 
image of knowledge as growing entails a corresponding growth of ignorance.  
Ignorance may be construed in different ways however.  It is not just ‘not to know’ but 
may suggest decay and the dismantling of a complex structure, or ‘something more 
primordial... the cognitive facet of the moral term evil’ (Vitebsky p. 1)28. Both 
knowledge and ignorance, as we have seen, are peculiarly ideal and timeless notions, 
which, rather than describing unambiguous states, are attributed to some people by 
others under particular circumstances, often with moral connotations.  The relationship 
between different knowledges, as propounded and used by their adherents, is then often 
less dialectical than confrontational (or ‘eristical’, Collingwood 1942: 181-245).  In 
other words, the proponents of one ‘system’ attempt to eliminate other knowledges, 
portray them and those who use them as not just wrong, but as benighted and bad. 
 What is excluded in such confrontations is the existence of doubt.  In his essay, 
Vitebsky considers two ways of dealing with an important phenomenon where doubt 
and ignorance are inherent, namely death.  He contrasts the Freudian psychoanalysis 
and the use of mediums among Sora in India to show how both attempt to deal with the 
unknown through dialogue, the former between analyst and patient, the latter between 
the mourner and deceased.  He argues for considering forms of knowing not as true or 
false, but as appropriate to their knowers and users (p. 9).  ‘Yet at the same time local 
knowledge is often total, by virtue of the very fact that it is local’ (p. 9).  By contrast, 
the more medicalized, scientific and so universalized psychiatry becomes, the less it is 
able to cope with context ‘because it applies to everywhere and nowhere, everybody 
and nobody’ (p. 12).  So ignorance differs in degree and kind according to the 
presuppositions of different knowledges. 
 Throughout this Introduction, I have argued for considering knowing, as do many 
of the peoples discussed in this volume, as a act which involves work as part of one’s 
relationships with others.  From this point of view, the use of abstract nouns to 
encapsulate such processes has interesting consequences.  As Vitebsky notes, 
adjectives and verbs to do with knowing and being ignorant ‘belong to the realm of 
attribute and agency, and the use of the nouns is a denial or diminution of this agency’ 
(p. 7).  The act of nominalizing converts processes of knowing into a commodity, 
‘knowledge’, which becomes a thing in itself and turns people into objects or patients.  
‘In development reports, just as in medicine and clinical psychiatry, writers often make 
the abstract noun usurp the verb and strip it of its agency’.  Or ‘they turn it round and 
                                                 
28 This last rendition catches some of the implications of the Hindu notion of tamas, desire or ignorance 
(often associated with darkness), which in Bali is often spoken of one of the three constituents, triguna, 
of human nature (the other two being sattva, purity or knowledge, and rajas, passion or emotion; Hobart 
1986: 148-51).  On their constitution in Indian Vaishnava texts as strands or substrata of all matter, see 
Inden 1985. 
replace its active voice with the passive and impersonal...  In this way, it is not only 
agency which is diminished, but also causality, and hence responsibility’ (p. 12) 
 Such nominalizing and abstraction are arguably central to the representation of 
scientific knowledge as hegemonic.  One consequence is to turn people who were at 
least part agents into a backward and inert proletariat, the masses, who come to be 
constituted as passive objects to be developed.  It is little wonder that attempts to 
develop them so often fail or go awry.  The idea that modern education will solve the 
problem appears equally ill-founded.  As Henry pointed out, behind the overt 
pedagogic aims of enlightening and broadening school childrens’ knowledge lurks a 
‘hidden curriculum’ in which fear and inadequacy are inculcated (1966: 182-321).  
Various organizations obviously have an interest in perpetuating a large population of 
passive political subjects and pliant consumers, who have been rendered uncritical, or 
at least silently and ineffectually so.  The British government’s educational policy for 
the state sector in the early 1990s stresses ‘basic knowledge’, designed to produce the 
‘gammas and deltas’ of Huxley’s Brave New World, the new labouring class who will 
mindlessly and uncomplainingly man the word processors of the future.  
‘Underdevelopment’ is not a peculiar phenomenon of the evolution of distant countries, 
but a continuous process.  One aim of this collection is to argue that knowledge is not 
what it is often represented to be and to address the problems and implications of the 
growth of ignorance. 
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